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THE FUTURE IS BRIGHT COMPLICATED: 
AI, APPS & ACCESS TO JUSTICE  
EMILY S. TAYLOR POPPE* 
Introduction 
Women’s garments typically have buttons on the left side with openings 
on the right, opposite the orientation of men’s garments. The practice is 
clearly a historical relic, with the best explanation being the following: 
when clothing designs became standardized, the wealthy women who could 
afford buttons did not dress themselves.1 The servants who dressed them 
were more likely to be right-handed, so the buttons were positioned on the 
woman’s left to make it easier for servants to manipulate the fasteners.2 
This “button differential” reflects the fact that at one point in time, for the 
wealthy female portion of the population, dressing was not a task one did 
for oneself.3  
Today, the placement of buttons is all that remains of this history. 
Clothing styles are simpler and few of us require—or have access to—
assistance in dressing. Men’s valets and lady’s maids are occupations of the 
past. Could lawyers someday similarly be made obsolete? Will emerging 
legal technology enable lay individuals to resolve legal issues on their own, 
without the intervention of an attorney? Is the legal profession doomed?  
There is no question that technological advances are changing the 
practice of law. Artificial intelligence undertakes legal analysis, apps 
generate legal documents, digital search programs uncover relevant 
evidence, and dispute systems are migrating online.4 These advances are 
reshaping the boundaries between clients and lawyers, with some futurists 
predicting a world in which lawyers become increasingly obsolete. While 
even the most alarmist commentators agree that the annihilation of the legal 
                                                                                                                 
 * Assistant Professor of Law at the University of California, Irvine School of Law. 
Thank you to the organizers and participants of the University of Oklahoma Law Review 
Symposium and the University of California Socio-Legal Studies Workshop for their helpful 
comments.  
 1. Megan Garber, The Curious Case of Men and Women’s Buttons, ATLANTIC (Mar. 27, 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/03/the-curious-case-of-men-
and-womens-buttons/388844/ (“The most reasonable theory [for the difference] has to do with 
the fact that, when clothing conventions were becoming standardized, many women did not 
dress themselves.”).  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id.  
 4. See infra Part I.  
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profession has not yet arrived, some see the “great disruption” as having 
begun.5  
In particular, commentators argue that legal technology is already 
chipping away at the role for lawyers in consumer-focused areas of law, 
where legal issues are less complex and less customized legal services 
suffice. One such area is estate planning, which scholars frequently 
characterize as ripe for disruption by legal technology.6 In support, several 
scholars point to the use of technological interventions that enable lay 
individuals to self-draft estate-planning instruments such as wills.7 Citing 
high rates of intestacy8 as evidence of unmet legal need, this popular 
narrative suggests that legal technology will decrease the number of probate 
lawyers while also increasing access to justice.  
In this Article, I take seriously this claim, which is offered as evidence 
of the disruptive and democratizing capacity of legal technology. Drawing 
on empirical research on civil legal needs and estate-planning behavior, I 
interrogate the validity of several assumptions that underlie this claim. 
Specifically, I evaluate adoption of estate-planning technologies, client 
capacity to identify and describe testamentary desires, issues in defining 
the scope of technological interventions, potential challenges in the 
enforceability of computer-generated wills, and the ongoing potential need 
for legal assistance in estate administration. While some assumptions find 
support in existing empirical work, others do not; several others merit 
additional investigation.  
Drawing on this illustrative example, I identify several themes that 
complicate predictions for legal technology’s potential to increase access 
to justice while diminishing the legal profession. First, I highlight the 
potential of legal technology to reproduce, rather than ameliorate, existing 
social inequalities. Second, I note the challenges raised by complete 
automation. Finally, I discuss the role of regulatory and doctrinal reforms 
in determining the trajectory of legal technology. Drawing on these themes, 
the Article advocates for more nuance and empirical grounding in debates 
about the future of lawyers and access to justice in the age of disruptive 
legal technology.  
                                                                                                                 
 5. See generally John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How 
Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041 (2014).  
 6. See sources cited infra note 41.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Individuals who die without a will are intestate. Intestate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(Westlaw, current through 10th ed., 2014). 
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The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I provide a brief overview of 
disruptive legal technologies and the predicted implications for the legal 
profession and access to legal services. In Part II, I turn my attention to the 
probate context, and consider the potential for disruptive innovation in 
estate planning. I first contextualize technological innovations by 
summarizing relevant law and current practices. I then describe 
technologies that seek to eliminate the need for legal representation in the 
preparation of estate-planning instruments. In Part III, I consider the 
empirical assumptions that underlie predictions of technological disruption 
in probate practice. Drawing on this analysis, I identify several themes in 
Part IV that apply to predictions regarding technological disruption more 
broadly. These themes suggest that the future of lawyers in the age of 
disruptive legal technology is more complicated than some have suggested. 
I conclude by urging scholars and policymakers to consider persistent 
social and economic realities as they make predictions about the future of 
access to justice. 
I. Disruptive Legal Technology  
Economic instability, competition from alternative sources of expertise, 
and globalization all threaten the existing structure of the legal profession. 
However, legal futurists suggest that technology has the potential to disrupt 
the practice of law even more fundamentally, bringing massive change to 
the legal profession and the form and content of law itself.9 This possibility 
has attracted the attention of practitioners,10 scholars,11 and leaders of the 
bar,12 who seek to understand the implications.  
                                                                                                                 
 9. RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE 15 
(2d ed. 2017). 
 10. See, for example, the rise of business consultants focused on legal technology (e.g., 
Stuart A. Forsyth, Perspectives from a Legal Futurist: Challenges to the Courts and the Legal 
Community, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 913 (2010) (report from the “owner and principal of The Legal 
Futurist, an independent consulting practice, providing long-range strategic planning and 
visioning services to all components of the justice system”). 
 11. See, for example, law review symposia dedicated to artificial intelligence and law: 
Symposium, Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming 
of Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); Symposium, Artificial Intelligence, 
Technology, and the Law, 69 U. TORONTO L.J. (SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUE) 1 (2018); Symposium, 
Artificial Intelligence and the Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Symposium, Legal Reasoning 
and Artificial Intelligence: How Computers “Think” Like Lawyers, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 1 (2001).  
 12. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, THE RELEVANT LAWYER: REIMAGINING THE FUTURE OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION (2015).  
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Making prophecies is a tricky business,13 and predictions for the future 
of the legal profession range from alarmist14 to optimistic.15 However, 
predictions for the overall trajectory of technological disruption in law are 
relatively consistent. Underlying—and exacerbating—the disruptive 
potential of legal technology is the increasing disaggregation of legal 
work.16 This disaggregation creates the possibility for multiple sources of 
legal information and services,17 leading to commodification and increasing 
competition. Following Clayton Christiansen’s theory of disruptive 
technologies,18 disruption is predicted to begin at the bottom of the legal 
market.19 As technologies improve and are able to meet the demands of 
other segments of the market, the disruptive technology will spread until it 
ultimately becomes dominant.20  
The diffusion of disruption across market segments depends on the 
capacity of technologies to meet the needs of clients.21 Because the higher 
echelons of the legal market concern matters of greater complexity and 
novelty—where “bespoke” legal services have been the norm—disruption 
                                                                                                                 
 13. DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE SALMON OF DOUBT 102 (2002) (“Trying to predict the future 
is a mug’s game.”).  
 14. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL 
SERVICES 273 (2008) (“I expect that there will be significantly fewer lawyers providing 
traditional consultative advisory service; and I predict the emergence of new legal 
professionals with quite different roles in society. We will witness the end of many lawyer as 
we know and recognize them today . . . .”).  
 15. Albert H. Yoon, The Post-Modern Lawyer: Technology and the Democratization of 
Legal Representation, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 456, 457 (2016) (offering a more “optimistic” take 
on the future direction of the legal profession); see also Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can 
Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
501, 530 (2017) (finding that areas where legal technology is likely to have only a light effect 
on tasks that account for more than half of lawyers’ time).  
 16. SUSSKIND, supra note 9, at 33.  
 17. Id. at 36-42.  
 18. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL ix-xxiv (1997).  
 19. Raymond H. Brescia et al., Embracing Disruption: How Technological Change in the 
Delivery of Legal Services Can Improve Access to Justice, 78 ALB. L. REV. 553, 565 (2014) 
(“[W]e should look for the ways that disruption is coming, or could come, to the lower 
segments of the market because that is where true disruptive innovation begins and takes 
hold.”); SUSSKIND, supra note 9, at 45.  
 20. Brescia et al., supra note 19, at 558; Benjamin H. Barton, Technology Can Solve 
Much of America’s Access to Justice Problem, If We Let It, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS 
TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 459 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016).  
 21. See SUSSKIND, supra note 9, at 44.  
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in this area is anticipated to require more sophisticated technology. Thus, 
the potential for disruption varies by area and type of practice.22  
The range of legal technologies with disruptive potential can be arranged 
on a continuum, with differing implications for the practice of law.23 At one 
end are new modes of delivering legal information. A basic example is a 
static website that publishes legal information.24 Lexis and Westlaw are 
examples of more advanced web-based delivery of legal information, 
where the combination of large amounts of data and increasingly refined 
search features add value.25 Legal platforms that connect potential clients 
to legal service providers might also be placed in this category, although 
serving a different function than legal encyclopedias or online resource 
information.  
Search technologies are also used in e-discovery.26 These technologies 
are more disruptive because they automate tasks previously undertaken by 
lawyers.27However, the scope of the resulting disruption is limited because 
these are tasks generally undertaken by junior lawyers28 who were already 
subject to outsourcing.29  
Document preparation applications are another form of automation. The 
most basic automate the creation of documents at the direction of a human 
scrivener. More sophisticated technologies generate documents that are 
drafted by a computer algorithm in response to input provided by a human. 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature Disruption of Legal 
Services, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1797, 1846; Yoon, supra note 15, at 468 (“[T]he contribution 
of . . . intelligence augmentation technologies varies by practice of law.”).  
 23. See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or—How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 
EMORY L.J. 909, 910-12 (2013) (discussing the automation of basic tasks associated with the 
practice of law that has already occurred and the disruption yet to come from emerging 
technologies); McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 5, at 3046 (tracing the anticipated effect of 
technology on several types of legal tasks).  
 24. Brescia et al., supra note 19, at 569-70 (describing web-based lawyer directories and 
legal encyclopedias).  
 25. Id. at 568 (describing the evolution of the websites’ search capabilities).  
 26. McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 5, at 3047-48.  
 27. Id.  
 28. Remus & Levy, supra note 15, at 530. 
 29. Tanina Rostain, Robots Versus Lawyers: A User-Centered Approach, 30 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 559, 565 (2017) (noting that, in the corporate sphere at least, the functions that 
legal technologies are automating are those “that corporations had already moved outside of 
law firms and routinized”).  
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For example, there are programs that ask clients questions and then 
formulate a legal document that accomplishes their stated objectives.30  
Finally, the technologies viewed as having the greatest disruptive 
potential perform legal prediction.31 As these technologies develop, some 
scholars argue that they will disrupt not only legal practice, but also the 
creation of law. Because the technologies leverage big data and machine 
learning, these scholars predict that we will be able to generate law that is 
increasingly complex and minutely detailed.32 Professor Benjamin Alarie 
even foresees the creation of a “seamless legal order, which is universally 
accessible in real time” and dictates ex ante the application of law to all 
possible situations, a phenomenon he terms the “legal singularity.”33  
 The role of lawyers in these visionary future worlds varies. Some 
commentators emphasize the potential of technologies that remove the need 
for attorney intervention, termed “substitutive legal automation.”34 Taken 
to the extreme, this suggests a bleak future for the legal profession. Others 
find this vision unlikely, focusing instead on the potential for technology to 
enhance lawyers’ capacity through “intelligence augmentation.”35  
Both scenarios, however, predict an increase in access to justice, 
although the mechanism through which this is achieved differs.36 Those 
who favor the potential of substitutive legal technology foresee increases 
in clients’ capacity for self-help.37 In contrast, others see technology 
reducing the costs of legal practice, allowing lawyers to expand their 
practices into latent legal markets.38  
  
                                                                                                                 
 30. See infra Part II.  
 31. Katz, supra note 23, at 912 (commenting on the rise of “the most disruptive of all 
possible displacing technologies—quantitative legal prediction”).  
 32. See, e.g., Benjamin Alarie, The Path of the Law: Towards Legal Singularity, 66 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 443, 445 (2016) (predicting the possibility of complete law); Anthony J. Casey 
& Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1410 (2017) 
(predicting the rise of “microdirectives” in place of rules and standards in law).  
 33. Alarie, supra note 32, at 446.  
 34. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal 
Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2019) (defining “substitutive legal automation”).  
 35. Yoon, supra note 15, at 469 (arguing that it is unlikely that technology will enable 
litigants to bypass lawyers altogether).  
 36. See Raymond H. Brescia, What We Know and Need to Know About Disruptive 
Innovation, 67 S.C. L. REV. 203, 210 (2016) (describing ways that disruptive technology could 
be used).  
 37. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 20.  
 38. Yoon, supra note 15, at 469-71.  
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Ultimately, however, the disruptive power of legal technology—and its 
ability to increase access to justice—will not depend solely on questions of 
technological capacity. The regulatory and political environment will 
influence the role of technology in legal practice.39 Regulations on the 
unauthorized practice of law (UPL), in particular, have the potential to 
curtail the development and adoption of technology in law.40  
Thus, there is significant variation in predictions for the ultimate fate of 
the legal profession, but broad agreement that technological disruption is 
likely to begin in certain practice areas. Those areas viewed as being most 
susceptible to disruption involve document preparation for similar, 
repeated transactions, and are underserved by the current market. The most 
consistently cited example is estate planning.41 Because probate practice is 
characterized as being so well suited to disruption by existing legal 
technology, it presents a valuable test case that I take up in the next 
Section.42 
  
                                                                                                                 
 39. Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Four Futures of Legal Automation, 63 UCLA L. 
REV. DISCOURSE 26, 29 (2015).  
 40. See Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the Public? 
Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2607-08 (2014). 
But see Barton, supra note 20, at 457-60 (arguing that some types of disruptive legal 
technology have become sufficiently entrenched that they will likely succeed in spite of UPL 
regulations).  
 41. McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 5, at 3050 (“Trust and estate planning is already ripe 
for . . . mechanization because this area of law has relatively few kinds of forms and unique 
factual situations that arise for the large majority of people.”); see also Benjamin H. Barton, 
The Lawyer’s Monopoly – What Goes and What Stays, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3067, 3072 
(2014) (“The most obvious examples of computerization in legal services are online forms 
providers like LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer. These companies provide . . . forms to online 
consumers for . . . [inter alia] wills and trusts . . . .”); Brescia, supra note 36, at 213 (“Simple 
documents like Living wills and Powers of Attorney can be prepared through the inputting of 
data gathered from responses to simple questionnaires.”); Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big 
Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 799 (suggesting the possibility of retailing law, including the 
possibility that “[c]hains like Wal-Mart and Tesco can sell wills”). An early summary of 
artificial intelligence advances in law addresses estate planning directly. L. Thorne McCarty, 
Artificial Intelligence and Law: How to Get There from Here, 3 RATIO JURIS 189, 192-93 
(1990). 
 42. It is for this reason—estate planning’s reputation as an area appropriate for 
automation—that I focus on this topic. It is not because I wish to suggest that estate planning 
is the area of most significant unmet legal need.  
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II. Legal Technology & Estate Planning 
Probate has a reputation as something of a legal backwater.43 The practice 
leans local; state law governs, state courts have exclusive jurisdiction,44 and 
practitioners and local court actors interact repeatedly.45 Probate practice 
becomes more cosmopolitan only when large—indeed, after recent tax 
reform, very large—amounts of wealth are involved, triggering federal 
transfer taxes46 and the multi-jurisdictional administration of complex 
holdings. Although it is an area of practice requiring specialization,47 judges’ 
impressions of the quality of legal representation in this area are middling,48 
and popular perception of estate planning lawyers is not much better.49  
Despite these opinions of probate practice—or more accurately, because 
of them—estate planning is a practice area seen as ripe for disruption by 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Jack Leonard, Robin Fields & Evelyn Larrubia, Justice Sleeps While Seniors Suffer, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Nov. 14, 2005, 3:00 AM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/la-me-
conserve14nov14-story.html (“Probate Court is a legal backwater, the least glamorous branch 
of any courthouse.”); see also John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1975) (referencing “[t]he low estate of the probate courts”).  
 44. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 299 (2006) (“Among longstanding limitations on 
federal jurisdiction otherwise properly exercised are the so-called ‘domestic relations’ and 
‘probate exceptions.’”).  
 45. Leonard, Fields & Larrubia, supra note 43 (“[Probate law] is an arcane world of trusts, 
wills and conservatorships that breeds familiarity among judges, attorneys and 
conservators.”).  
 46. See 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c)(3)(C) (2018) (increasing the basic estate tax exclusion 
amount to $10 million and incorporating cost-of-living adjustments equal to $1.4 million to 
exempt estates of up to $11.4 million from estate tax for decedents dying in 2019).  
 47. Charles I. Stone, The Function of the Lawyer in Estate Planning, 24 WASH. L. REV. 
& ST. B.J. 197, 198 (1949) (noting even seventy years ago that practitioners believed “[e]state 
planning richly deserves, and increasingly requires, at least a measure of specialization”); see 
also Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Specialization, Sources of Certification, AM. B. 
ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_comm 
issions/standing-committee-on-specialization/resources/resources_for_lawyers/sources_of_ 
certification/ (last visited May 15, 2019) (providing a directory of contemporary specialization 
certification programs, many of which include estate planning).  
 48. Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal 
Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 331 tbl.6 (2011). Because trusts and estates was 
combined with tax, even the middling assessments provided are likely positively biased, since 
tax implications would suggest larger matters which are typically handled by larger firms and 
more specialized lawyers.  
 49. Leonard, Fields & Larrubia, supra note 43 (“[I]t’s only fuddy-duddy lawyers without 
color to their skin who do it. That’s the public perception of probate law.”). But cf. THE 
DESCENDANTS (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2011) (featuring George Clooney as Hawaiian estate-
planning lawyer Matt King).  
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technology.50 While bad news for lawyers who practice in this area, many 
view the disruption as forecasting improved access to justice.51 To 
contextualize these claims, I first describe the structure of succession law and 
current patterns of use. I then describe technology applicable to the estate-
planning context.  
A. The Laws of Succession and Probate Practice  
Only the living may own property; at death, ownership lapses and property 
must be transmitted.52 The laws of succession govern these transfers. In the 
United States, succession laws are dedicated to the freedom of disposition, 
and grant decedents broad authority to direct the distribution of their property 
after death.53 This includes the freedom to allocate relative shares of one’s 
property and to distribute specific items of property to the individuals, 
charities, or entities of one’s choosing. This freedom also encompasses the 
inverse: the ability to restrict individuals from inheriting54 or to condition the 
receipt of property.55 Together, these freedoms allow decedents to support 
dependents, transmit wealth to future generations, comply with religious 
mandates, or effectuate more idiosyncratic desires.56  
To exercise these freedoms, however, individuals must designate their 
distributive wishes in a will or arrange for the transfer of their property 
through nonprobate mechanisms. The administration of a decedent’s estate 
pursuant to a will takes place in probate court.57 Nonprobate transfers take 
place outside of the supervision of the probate court through revocable trusts, 
pay-on-death accounts, other will substitutes that rely on beneficiary 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See sources cited supra note 41.  
 51. Barton, supra note 20, at 449. 
 52. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
INHERITANCE LAW 15 (2009).  
 53. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 1 (10th ed. 
2017); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) (noting that “the right to pass on 
valuable property to one’s heirs is itself a valuable right” and is subject to legal protection).  
 54. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010) (“A decedent 
by will may expressly exclude or limit the right of an individual or class to succeed to property 
of the decedent passing by intestate succession.”).  
 55. See infra Section IV.D.  
 56. See, e.g., Niraj Chokshi, Choupette, Karl Lagerfeld’s Cat, Has a Million Reasons to 
Purr, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/20/style/karl-lagerfeld-
choupette-cat.html (describing Lagerfeld’s plan to leave millions of dollars to his cat).  
 57. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of 
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1109 (1984).  
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designation forms (i.e., retirement accounts, life insurance policies), and 
joint-ownership arrangements.58  
In many cases, estate planning reflects a desire to control not only 
distribution but also the process of administration. For example, the desire to 
avoid probate—and its attendant fees, costs, delay, and publicity—has long 
been a motivator for estate planning,59 even if probate’s supposed ills are not 
fully supported by empirical investigation.60 In addition, wills and trusts 
allow individuals to nominate or appoint individuals to positions of trust. 
Individuals can appoint executors and trustees under wills and trusts, 
respectively, to administer and distribute assets.61 Estate-planning 
instruments also designate the terms under which these individuals serve. 
These terms can have implications that are far-reaching, such as when 
business control is at stake. Last, but potentially of great significance, many 
individuals use wills to nominate guardians for minor children or other 
dependents.  
In addition to these functions, estate planning can be expressive. This can 
be accomplished indirectly, such as through distributive provisions or 
fiduciary appointments. Specific bequest of a financially or emotionally 
valuable asset, for example, can express feelings of warmth or appreciation; 
disinheritance of a close family member can express the opposite. In addition, 
because testators know that individuals will form opinions about them based 
on their estate plans,62 they may seek to establish a favorable legacy through 
generosity at death. As the author of an early collection of notable wills 
writes, “Our earthly possessions are, after all, but life-holdings, and the grace 
with which we part with them at the end of life’s journey shows the heart in 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id.  
 59. NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE (1965). 
 60. David Horton, In Partial Defense of Probate: Evidence from Alameda County, 
California, 103 GEO. L.J. 605, 609-13 (2015) [hereinafter Horton, Partial Defense].  
 61. Sophisticated trusts may also appoint individuals and entities to advisory positions 
that may not be subject to fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Trust 
Protector: A Question of Fiduciary Power – Should a Trust Protector Be Held to a Fiduciary 
Standard, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 67, 71 (2010) (describing the use of trust protectors).  
 62. This is well illustrated by a cartoon depicting a man at a funeral who says, “My eulogy 
is, of course, contingent on the will.” Kate Beaton, “My Eulogy Is, of Course, Contingent on 
the Will” – New Yorker Cartoon, ALLPOSTERS, https://www.allposters.com/-sp/My-eulogy-
is-of-course-contingent-on-the-will-New-Yorker-Cartoon-Posters_i9180089_ 
.htm?UPI=PGS7A30&PODConfigID=8419449 (last visited May 25, 2019) (originally 
published in the New Yorker on Feb 28, 2011). 
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its least disguised form.”63 Estate-planning instruments can also make 
explicit statements, although this is less common in the modern era than 
might be expected.64  
Individuals who fail to undertake any estate planning forego the right to 
all of these benefits.65 Any property not disposed of by will or through 
nonprobate transfers is distributed to the decedent’s heirs by operation of the 
laws of intestacy. Designed as majoritarian default rules that produce the 
wishes of the average decedent, these laws of descent and distribution reflect 
a dedication to the freedom of disposition tempered by concerns of 
administrative ease and public policy.66  
Whether they actually accomplish the desires of a given decedent, 
however, will vary. Nonmarital couples and blended families, in particular, 
are less likely to be well served by intestacy. Moreover, the probate court will 
appoint individuals to administer the estate, which may result in 
appointments that are inconsistent with the decedent’s wishes. Finally, 
distributions to minors can also be problematic without estate planning, 
necessitating ongoing court oversight in some cases.  
Thus, estate planning enables individuals to avoid intestacy and direct the 
distribution of their property at death, to identify those individuals whom 
they want to carry out those plans, and through these terms to offer a final 
                                                                                                                 
 63. VIRGIL M. HARRIS, ANCIENT, CURIOUS AND FAMOUS WILLS viii (1911); see also 
Daphna Hacker, Soulless Wills, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 957, 962 979 (2010) (“[A] bequethal 
encompasses the giver’s preferences, decisions, and personality, as well as possibly reflecting 
the recipients’ gratitude, disappointment, remembrance, and, hopefully, respect for the giver’s 
choice and wishes.”).  
 64. See Hacker, supra note 63, at 962 (describing historical antecedents of the modern 
will that more frequently “included personal and emotional expressions or [were] 
accompanied by separate spiritual and ethical instruments and guidance”). 
 65. The decedent’s failure to engage in estate planning may also be felt by the decedent’s 
heirs. See Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making Things Fair”: An Empirical Study of How 
People Approach the Wealth Transmission System, 22 ELDER L.J. 325, 339 (2015) (noting, 
from qualitative study of estate planning, that “when there had been advance planning—of 
any type—[the families of the decedent] reacted with appreciation”).  
 66. Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 645 (2014) (“In accordance with the principle of freedom of disposition, 
the primary objective in designing an intestacy statute is to carry out the probable intent of the 
typical intestate decedent—that is, to provide majoritarian default rules for property 
succession at death.”); cf. Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in 
Search of its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2004) (arguing that intestacy laws 
have “become a theoretical grab-bag [with] [s]cholars and lawmakers . . . prepared to 
acknowledge the relevance of virtually every conceivable preference—that of the decedent, 
that of survivors, that of society—all mixed together in no particular order”).  
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testament. However, to do so, these instruments must be valid and 
enforceable. Wills have traditionally been governed by a rigid legal regime 
that required compliance with several formalities.67 Although holographic 
(handwritten) wills have a long history, they are not accepted in all 
jurisdictions.68 The typical will is a written instrument that must be signed 
and witnessed by at least two competent witnesses.69 These requirements are 
designed to serve several functions: evidentiary, channeling, cautionary, and 
protective.70 In addition, the testator must have testamentary capacity and not 
be acting under the influence of delusion, fraud, mistake, or undue influence.  
There is a move in many states to liberalize these requirements, and an 
ongoing dispute among scholars as to the favorability of these reforms.71 The 
aspect of this topic that merits special attention for purposes of this Article is 
the fact that the liberalization of wills formalities lays the foundation for 
many technological innovations. The use of many fill-in forms, for example, 
would be impossible absent this doctrinal evolution.  
Moreover, it is also important to appreciate that nonprobate instruments, 
such as revocable trusts and will substitutes, are not subject to the same 
formalities requirements. Given the wealth holdings of most Americans and 
the widespread use of will substitutes, much more property is now distributed 
through nonprobate transfers than through the probate process.72 This shift 
can be viewed as increasing access to estate planning by making it easier for 
lay individuals to direct the distribution of their property at death without 
triggering the legal complexities of wills. However, it also generates potential 
pitfalls for decedents who do not appropriately account for probate and 
nonprobate property. 
B. The Use of Estate Planning 
All of us will die and nearly all of us possess something that we believe to 
be of value that we would like to pass on when we do, even if our assets are 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Langbein, supra note 43, at 489 (“The law of wills is notorious for its harsh and 
relentless formalism.”).  
 68. JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING 1001-78 tbl.1 
(2018) (describing the formal will requirements of each state including acceptance of 
holographic wills).  
 69. Langbein, supra note 43, at 490.  
 70. Id. at 492-98.  
 71. See, e.g., id. at 530 (advocating for the adoption of the substantial compliance 
doctrine); David Horton, Wills Law on the Ground, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1094, 1145 (2015) 
[hereinafter Horton, Wills Law] (supporting adoption of harmless error to signature defects).  
 72. Langbein, supra note 57.  
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meager by financial metrics. Despite this, there is surprising variation in the 
rate at which individuals engage in estate planning.  
Our empirical understanding of estate-planning behavior is incomplete, 
hindered by data limitations.73 However, several important themes emerge 
from existing studies. First among these is the prevalence of intestacy. While 
estate plans offer a number of benefits, many individuals nevertheless fail to 
create them.74 The most recent will study found that 40% of the probate 
estates opened in Alameda County, California, for decedents who died in 
2007 were intestacies.75 Because California is a community property state 
that provides nonprobate alternatives for surviving spouses, this number 
likely underestimates rates of intestacy in California and nationally.76 Earlier 
will studies also document high levels of intestate estates.77  
However, will studies are imperfect sources of information because they 
underrepresent low-value estates (which avoid probate and are more likely 
to be intestate) and overrepresent older individuals (who are more likely to 
die and more likely to have wills), both of which likely lead to negatively 
biased estimates of intestacy.78 Indeed, a nationally representative survey 
found that 68% of respondents reported being intestate, while 20% had a will 
drafted by an attorney and another 11% reported having a self-drafted will.79 
This is a valuable insight, but it relies on a small sample (n=324).80 The 
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), a longitudinal study of a nationally 
representative sample of approximately 20,000 older adults sponsored by the 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See Horton, Partial Defense, supra note 60, at 610 (“[W]e know almost nothing about 
what happens in modern probate court.”).  
 74. HARRIS, supra note 63, at vii (“It must not be forgotten that while all men may make 
wills, and should do so, yet all men have not done so.”).  
 75. Horton, Partial Defense, supra note 60, at 627 (reporting that 269 of the 668 estates 
studied were intestacies).  
 76. Id. at 626 (noting that the use of the spousal petition was evident from the 
demographic distribution of the probate estates observed).  
 77. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Christopher J. Walker & Ben Hernandez-Stern, The 
Inheritance Process in San Bernadino County, California, 1964: A Research Note, 43 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1445, 1453 (2007) (reporting that 171 of 513 probate records from decedents who 
died in 1964 in San Bernardino County, California, were intestacies); Robert A. Stein & Ian 
G. Fierstein, The Demography of Probate Administration, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 54, 79 (1985) 
(reporting that the proportion of decedents who died in 1972 who had estates that underwent 
probate in select jurisdictions in California, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Texas who 
were testate ranged from 50% to 86% across states). 
 78. Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and Demographic 
Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 39 (2009).  
 79. Id. at 41.  
 80. Id.  
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National Institute on Aging and the Social Security Administration,81 offers 
a much larger sample, but one that is focused exclusively on Americans age 
fifty and over.82 The most recent wave of that survey found that in 2014, just 
over 51% of respondents in the top wealth quintile reported having a will, 
while the same was true of 50%, 47%, 36%, and 20% of respondents in the 
second, third, fourth, and bottom wealth quintiles, respectively.83 All of 
which is to say that while we may not know exactly how many Americans 
are intestate, it is clearly a substantial portion of the population.  
However, it is not a representative portion of the population. For example, 
the HRS data indicate a positive correlation between wealth and estate 
planning, which is consistent with anecdotal accounts. Other socio-
demographic factors associated with estate planning include education, race, 
marital status, age, and family structure.84 Descriptive85 and multiple 
regression results86 find that whites are more likely than individuals of other 
races or ethnicities to have estate plans, as are individuals with college or 
greater educational attainment. Experience of major life events, including a 
change in health or financial status, is also associated with an increase in the 
probability of adopting an estate plan, even after adjusting for other socio-
demographic characteristics.87 
Thus, while we lack comprehensive data on the prevalence of intestacy, it 
is clear that unequal take-up of estate planning both reflects and replicates 
existing social inequality. Many scholars see technology as offering a 
solution. 
C. Technological Innovations in Estate Planning 
It is against the backdrop of widespread need and limited—and unequal—
use of legal services that predictions of technological disruption in estate 
                                                                                                                 
 81. About, HRS: HEALTH AND RETIREMENT STUDY, https://hrs.isr.umich.edu/about (last 
visited June 20, 2019).  
 82. Welcome to the Study!, HRS: HEALTH AND RETIREMENT STUDY, http://hrsparticipants. 
isr.umich.edu/ (last visited June 20, 2019).  
 83. Russell N. James III, The New Statistics of Estate Planning: Lifetime and Post-
Mortem Wills, Trusts, and Charitable Planning, 8 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 1, 25 
tbl.11 (2015) (describing the use of wills and trusts across various socio-demographic 
characteristics, but unfortunately not providing an overall rate).  
 84. Id. at 18, 37-38. 
 85. Id.; DiRusso, supra note 78, at 43, 49.  
 86. Lance Palmer, Vibha Bhargava & Gong-Soog Hong, Will Adoption and Life Events 
Among Older Adults, 15 FIN. SERV. REV. 281, 291 tbl.3 (2006). 
 87. Id. at 282.  
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planning are offered.88 In this Section, I describe the interventions most 
frequently referenced in these predictions, which are aimed at lay individuals. 
There are several technological innovations designed for use by estate-
planning attorneys,89 such as those that run calculations to optimize 
transactions from a tax perspective, generate accounts for estates and trusts,90 
and partially automate drafting. The use of artificial intelligence will also 
likely expand in the future to assist lawyers in making legal determinations. 
However, it is substitutive technology that is frequently presented as having 
the potential to put probate lawyers out of business while simultaneously 
increasing access to law.  
In general, these legal technologies fall on a continuum from static 
information to predictive analysis.91 Online information about estate 
planning is widely available. Static fill-in forms have existed for years, and 
in some states are even provided for free by statute.92 Apps that assist or 
automate drafting and administration represent current emerging 
technology.93 More complex automation or analytics have not yet been 
realized in this context.  
The technologies that are the focus of current commentary are interactive 
drafting aids. These programs, which are most commonly offered online, ask 
                                                                                                                 
 88. It is important to note that lack of legal action is not necessarily indicative of unmet 
legal needs. Rebecca L. Sandefur, What We Know and Need to Know About the Legal Needs 
of the Public, 67 S.C. L. REV. 443, 451 (2016) (distinguishing between justiciable situations 
that do not require legal intervention and unmet legal needs). While formal estate planning 
offers the testator greater certainty that his or her wishes will be carried out, this may not be 
necessary for all individuals, particularly if their estates may be handled informally. Cahn & 
Ziettlow, supra note 65, at 329 (reporting finding from qualitative study of estate 
administration that in the informal administration of intestate estates families may be guided 
by the testator’s oral wishes).  
 89. Jamie J. Baker, 2018: A Legal Research Odyssey: Artificial Intelligence as Disruptor, 
110 LAW LIBR. J. 5, 13 (2018) (“To date, expert systems have been developed for use by 
attorneys working in bankruptcy, immigration, estate planning, food and drug safety, and 
securities matters.”). 
 90. Quicken Fiduciary Accounting Templates, ACTEC FOUND., (Oct. 26, 2018), 
https://actecfoundation.org/quicken-templates/.  
 91. See infra Part I. 
 92. Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Will Methodologies—Incorporated Forms vs. Fill-In 
Forms: Rivalry or Peaceful Coexistence?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 232, 243-44 (1990). Another 
proposal is to incorporate estate planning into the tax-return filing process. Reid Kress 
Weisbord, Facilitating Homemade Wills, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA 395 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016).  
 93. See REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, LEGAL TECH FOR NON-LAWYERS: REPORT OF THE SURVEY 
OF US LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES (2019), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/ 
documents/report_us_digital_legal_tech_for_nonlawyers.pdf.  
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testators several questions and then provide a fill-in form to draft a will or 
trust. RocketLawyer and LegalZoom are the leading players in this area.94 
Programs vary in the level of assistance and customization provided.95 While 
greater interaction may increase the quality of the final product, it may also 
increase the likelihood that courts will find these programs to be instances of 
UPL.96 
III. Empirical Assumptions 
The suggestion that estate planning is ripe for disruption by this 
technology relies on several empirical assumptions. These include 
assumptions about mobilization, capacity, and ability to resolve boundary, 
enforcement, and administration issues. In this Section, I describe these 
assumptions and evaluate them in light of existing empirical evidence. I 
conclude that even if we assume that UPL enforcement does not prevent the 
adoption of these technologies, it is not clear that they will expand access to 
estate planning to the extent predicted by many accounts. Similarly, it is not 
clear that more advanced technologies based on artificial intelligence will 
overcome human limitations and behaviors that curtail potential increases in 
access to justice.  
A. Mobilization: Assumptions About Barriers to Estate Planning  
Visions of expanded access to estate planning through legal technology 
rely on several assumptions about why so many individuals are currently 
intestate. These assumptions are not well supported by existing evidence on 
civil legal needs. In particular, these visions ignore inequalities in access to 
online resources, overestimate the role of financial cost, discount the 
significance of psychic costs, and ignore popular understanding of estate 
planning as the domain of lawyers. 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Kristen E. Killian, The Long Tail and Demand Creation in the Legal Market, 11 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 157, 173 (2015).  
 95. LegalZoom, for example, offers customers a choice between drafting without 
assistance and upgrading to a bundled plan that includes a subscription to a legal-services plan 
that covers a thirty-minute consultation. Pricing Options, LEGALZOOM, https://www. 
legalzoom.com/personal/estate-planning/last-will-and-testament-pricing.html (last visited 
May 16, 2019).  
 96. Lauren Moxley, Zooming Past the Monopoly: A Consumer Rights Approach to 
Reforming the Lawyer’s Monopoly and Improving Access to Justice, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
553, 558 (2015); Maria A. Vida, Legality of Will-Creating Software: Is the Sale of Computer 
Software to Assist in Drafting Will Documents Considered the Unauthorized Practice of Law?, 
41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 231, 232-33 (2000).  
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1. Internet Access, Web Use, and Digital Literacy  
Initial challenges to predictions of expansive web-based legal assistance 
are accessibility and usability limitations. Although the majority of 
Americans have internet access, not all do.97 Moreover, many Americans rely 
on smartphones for internet access,98 and may incur data costs that make 
them infeasible for accessing legal services.99 In addition, individuals’ digital 
and general literacy may inhibit their use of web-based legal technologies.100 
As Rebecca Sandefur notes, a further limitation of web-based estate-planning 
resources is that individuals have to seek them out and be “able to distinguish 
good sources from bad.”101  
In sum, as research from the United Kingdom on the expansion of 
electronic delivery of government services highlights, potential users may 
range from those who have “no willingness to engage with online 
services . . . to those who exhibit willingness but lack ability . . . to those who 
might be considered ‘expert’ users.”102 This highlights the need for realistic 
assessments of the proportion of individuals who are likely to adopt and 
benefit from self-help technology.  
Scholars such as Benjamin Barton acknowledge these concerns, but argue 
that self-help technology remains the best way to expand access to justice.103 
Certainly, if we lack the will and resources to expand access to justice in 
other ways, anything may be better than nothing.104 Yet we should be realistic 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Lee Rainie, Internet, Broadband, and Cell Phone Statistics, PEW INTERNET & AM. 
LIFE PROJECT (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Internet-broadband-
and-cell-phone-statistics.aspx.  
 98. Id.  
 99. See CATRINA DENVIR, CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, UNIV. COLL. LONDON, ASSISTED 
DIGITAL SUPPORT FOR CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM USERS: DEMAND, DESIGN, & IMPLEMENTATION 
25 (Apr. 2018), https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/cjc-report-on-assisted-
digital-support.pdf (reporting on UK studies finding that data costs inhibited use of 
smartphones to access government services delivered digitally).  
 100. Rebecca Sandefur, Bridging the Gap: Rethinking Outreach for Greater Access to 
Justice, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 721, 736 (2015) [hereinafter Sandefur, Bridging the 
Gap]; REBECCA L. SANDEFUR ET AL., LEGAL TECH FOR NON-LAWYERS: REPORT OF THE SURVEY 
OF US LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES 11-14 (2019), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/ 
cms/documents/report_us_digital_legal_tech_for_nonlawyers.pdf.  
 101. Sandefur, Bridging the Gap, supra note 100, at 737.  
 102. CATRINA DENVIR, CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, ASSISTED DIGITAL SUPPORT FOR CIVIL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM USERS: DEMAND, DESIGN, & IMPLEMENTATION 4 (2018).  
 103. Barton, supra note 20, at 444-45 (acknowledging the limitations of technological 
assistance but heralding it as the “best bet” for addressing inequalities in access to justice).  
 104. But see infra Section IV.C (questioning the relative benefits of self-drafted will and 
intestacy).  
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about the extent to which technology will actually address unmet legal needs, 
particularly among those who are unlikely to benefit from technological 
interventions. Barton points out that increased use of self-help technology 
may free up resources that can be devoted to those most in need of traditional 
forms of legal assistance.105 However, it is also possible that the availability 
of in-person assistance will decline as technological innovations become 
established. 
2. Financial Cost  
Much of the perceived potential of legal technology to increase access to 
justice is based on its ability to reduce costs.106 Those who believe in the 
potential of substitutive legal technology for estate planning argue that costs 
can be reduced or even eliminated by removing the involvement of an 
attorney. In this case, the link to increased access to justice depends on an 
assumption that cost is a significant—or even the most significant—barrier 
to accessing legal representation. The validity of this assumption is 
questionable.  
We have limited evidence of the role of cost in dissuading individuals from 
undertaking estate planning, but the best existing study found that only 1% 
of respondents listed cost as the reason for lacking a will.107 This is consistent 
with empirical evidence on civil legal needs more generally, which finds that 
cost is not the barrier to legal representation that it is assumed to be.108 
3. Psychic Costs and Avoidance  
The following suggests two points: (1) reducing cost will not necessarily 
increase use of estate planning as dramatically as anticipated, and (2) 
something other than cost must explain the high rate of intestate decedents. 
A popular suggestion is that individuals refrain from engaging in estate 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Barton, supra note 20, at 444-45.  
 106. This assumption is found in many, if not most, writings on the potential benefits for 
access to justice. See, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 34, at 7 (“The most promising versions of 
legal automation are targeted at people who need and deserve—but cannot afford—an 
attorney.”). 
 107. Contemporary Studies Project, A Comparison of Iowans’ Dispositive Preferences 
with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1041, 
1077 tbl.10 (1978).  
 108. Sandefur, Bridging the Gap, supra note 100, at 722; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, To 
Lawyer or Not to Lawyer: Is That the Question¸ 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 875, 900 (2008) 
(showing that survey results from several countries suggest that “income has relatively little 
impact on decisions to seek the assistance or advice of a lawyer”).  
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planning because of the psychic cost of pondering one’s demise.109 This is 
consistent with empirical work finding the prevalence of procrastination as a 
reason for respondents’ lack of wills.110 
An article recounting the legendary design firm Ideo’s attempt to develop 
an app called After I Go, reports that the app’s original designer realized that 
“he couldn’t just build the right tool; he also had to build the motivation to 
do the job in the first place. . . . [T]he work After I Go needed to do was no 
longer rational but emotional.”111 Initially intended to facilitate estate 
planning and administration, plans for the app became more ambitious before 
it ultimately failed.112 The story highlights that technological innovations 
face the same psychological barriers as traditional forms of estate planning. 
4. Desire for Legal Expertise  
Finally, substitutive legal technology may also face a cultural barrier 
stemming from the broad understanding of wills as legal documents. For 
many civil legal problems, people do not seek legal assistance because they 
do not perceive the problem they are experiencing as a legal problem.113 
Paradoxically, estate planning may have the opposite problem: lay 
individuals are too aware that estate planning requires legal documents, and 
may believe that estate planning is a legal matter best undertaken by lawyers. 
Reid Kress Weisbord points out that individuals frequently engage in 
estate planning, but in the form of nonprobate beneficiary designations.114 He 
argues that it is because people view the “will-making process as unfamiliar, 
highly technical, burdensome, and expensive” that they don’t undertake it.115 
This suggests that to be successful, legal technology must overcome 
                                                                                                                 
 109. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 53, at 64 (“Some people put off making a will to 
avoid the unpleasantness of confronting mortality.”).  
 110. Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 107, at 1071. But cf. Reid Kress Weisbord, 
Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 899 (2013) 
(pointing out that similar concerns do not appear to apply to nonprobate transfers).  
 111. Jon Mooallem, Death, Redesigned: A Legendary Design Firm, a Corporate 
Executive, and a Buddhist-Hospice Director Take on the End of Life, CAL. SUNDAY MAG. 
(Apr. 5, 2015), https://stories.californiasunday.com/2015-04-05/death-redesigned.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Pascoe Pleasance, Nigel J. Balmer & Stian Reimers, What Really Drives Advice 
Seeking Behaviour? Looking Beyond the Subject of Legal Disputes, 1 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL 
SERIES, no. 6, 2011, at 1, 11, http://opo.iisj.net/index.php/osls/article/viewFile/56/227 
(documenting increase in planned advice-seeking when problems are identified as legal); 
Sandefur, Bridging the Gap, supra note 100, at 725 (attributing difference in observed rates 
of legal-advice-seeking, in part, to perceived alegality of problem faced).  
 114. Weisbord, supra note 110, at 899.  
 115. Id.  
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individuals’ hesitation of wading into what is broadly understood as technical 
legal territory. 
B. Boundary Problems 
A second set of empirical assumptions deals with technology’s ability to 
address boundary problems. When discussing disruptive technology and the 
great potential it offers for increasing access to estate planning, 
commentators frequently limit their claim to the preparation of “basic wills.” 
That is, an application that generates wills can substitute for legal 
representation so long as what the individual needs is a basic will.116 But what 
defines a basic will? Further, is a lay person—or an algorithm—able to 
determine whether or not a basic will is what is needed?  
A slightly different type of boundary problem arises from the divide 
between probate and nonprobate assets. As noted above, most wealth is now 
transferred via nonprobate mechanisms, leaving little to be transferred by 
will. Comprehensive estate plans account for this complexity in allocating 
expenses and distributions. Relatedly, effective estate plans consider not only 
the allocation of expenses and distributions across assets, but total assets 
relative to total bequests. Testators often intend for residuary legatees (those 
who take any assets remaining after payment of costs and specific bequests) 
to be the largest beneficiaries; this intent is frustrated if the estate is 
insufficient. These issues are becoming increasingly important given rising 
levels of personal debt. If self-help technology is going to replace lawyers, it 
must be able to address them.  
Ray Brescia has discussed boundary problems with regard to disruptive 
technology and access to justice more generally. As he points out, “an 
approach that provides one-size-fits-all services without an appropriate 
screening process to identify potential complicating factors runs the risk of 
surrendering important rights.”117 Thus, for substitutive legal technologies to 
succeed in the estate-planning context, they must be able to address the needs 
of all potential customers, or accurately distinguish those who can be served 
from those who cannot.  
C. Client Capacity: Identifying and Expressing Desires  
The primary objection to current technological interventions in estate 
planning is the concern that the instruments delivered will be of insufficient 
quality to meet the needs of clients. Is legal technology capable of enabling 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Yoon, supra note 15, at 465 (discussing the potential for emerging technology to 
automate tasks such as “the preparation of a basic will”).  
 117. Brescia, supra note 36, at 216.  
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a lay person to draft a will that effectuates the individual’s testamentary 
desires? Will the individual know whether the legal tech has succeeded?  
One empirical assumption underlying predictions of the rise of disruptive 
estate-planning technology is that clients can accurately identify and describe 
their testamentary desires, either on their own or with technological 
assistance. Because there may be a significant lapse of time between drafting 
and death, circumstances are likely to change.118 Thus, testators need to 
formulate not only their immediate, but also their contingent, desires. The 
resulting estate plan also must function effectively even as the value and 
identity of assets owned by the testator change. Relatedly, testators must 
decide how much flexibility they will incorporate into their estate plan versus 
how much dead-hand control they hope to exert. The extralegal significance 
of each of these decisions is easy to appreciate (imagine the potential family 
disruption resulting from one sibling being disfavored relative to another or 
the forced sale of a family heirloom to pay expenses that were poorly 
allocated). Not surprisingly, many testators strive to optimize soft goals like 
family harmony and fairness.119  
This reality presents several challenges for technological interventions. 
First, it means that the technology must elicit an accurate and comprehensive 
set of client preferences, which likely requires some amount of education and 
explanation for the testator. Because of the personal nature of these 
preferences, probate practice requires open communication.120 Indeed, to 
comply with their professional responsibilities, estate-planning lawyers are 
directed to meet personally with clients at the start of the representation.121 
In addition, the soft goals that many clients seek to optimize are harder to 
logically code than hard goals like tax minimization. Engaging in this form 
of optimization requires an understanding of family dynamics. This type of 
emotional intelligence is not a strength of even the most sophisticated 
                                                                                                                 
 118. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 53, at 325.  
 119. Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 65, at 331, 337 (describing “mak[ing] things fair” as an 
overarching goal of probate in most families).  
 120. Stone, supra note 47, at 198 (“I know of no comparable opportunity for combining 
on the broadest sort of base the personal, the practical, and the purely legal phases of the 
relationship between lawyer and client . . . .”); Do It Yourself Estate Planning, AM. B. ASS’N 
(Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/real_property_trust_estate/resources/ 
estate_planning/diy_estate_planning/.  
 121. AM. COLL. OF TR. & ESTATE COUNSEL, THE ACTEC COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 61 (5th ed. 2016) [hereinafter ACTEC COMMENTARIES ON 
THE MODEL RULES] (“In order to obtain sufficient information and direction from a client, and 
to explain a matter to a client sufficiently for the client to make informed decisions, a lawyer 
should meet personally with the client at the outset of the representation.”).  
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emerging technologies.122 Moreover, wills’ status as a boundary object that 
must serve multiple purposes across several audiences—the testator, legal 
actors, family members and friends, and society more broadly—makes it all 
the more challenging to construct.123 
Thus, there is reason to suspect that technological interventions may not 
yield estate plans that meet testators’ needs, but empirical evidence on this 
point is limited. Critics reference scathing reviews of existing programs, and 
caution against the “false sense of security” they provide.124 In contrast, 
proponents argue that there are many satisfied customers of online will-
preparation programs. However, legal services are credence goods, meaning 
that non-experts are incapable of assessing the quality of the services they 
receive.125 Many users of self-drafting programs likely lack sufficient legal 
knowledge to assess whether the will they have created achieves their 
testamentary desires.  
Moreover, any flaws in the will are most likely to become apparent after 
the testator’s death. Some scholars have highlighted the paucity of legal 
claims filed against the providers of self-drafting will programs for UPL that 
allege actual harm.126 Yet we would not expect to see lawsuits alleging harm 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Cassie Werber, The Five Most Important New Jobs in AI, According to KPMG, 
QUARTZ (Jan. 8, 2019), https://qz.com/work/1517594/the-five-most-important-new-ai-jobs-
according-to-kmpg/ (predicting that with the increase in artificial intelligence, new roles are 
likely to focus on humans’ ability to be “compassionate, empathetic, to have emotional 
intelligence”).  
 123. See Susan Leigh Star, The Structure of Ill-Structured Solutions: Boundary Objects 
and Heterogeneous Distributed Problem Solving, in 2 DISTRIBUTED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
37 (Les Gasser & Michael N. Huhns eds., 1989) (introducing the concept of “boundary 
objects”).  
 124. Rania Combs, LegalZoom vs. Lawyer: What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You, RANIA 
COMBS ATT’Y AT LAW (May 24, 2010), https://texaswillsandtrustslaw.com/2010/05/24/ 
legalzoom-vs-lawyer-what-you-dont-know-can-hurt-you/ (reporting on the experience of a 
licensed attorney who generated a flawed will using Legal Zoom and noting that experience 
“provides a glimpse at how even an educated consumer may be lulled into ‘peace of mind’ by 
a document with significant flaws”); see also Rob Graham, Empty Cache: When Legal Forms 
Frustrate Testamentary Intent, NEV. LAW., Jan. 2015, at 26; Legal DIY Websites are No Match 
for a Pro, CONSUMER REP. (Sept. 2012), https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/ 
magazine/2012/09/legal-diy-websites-are-no-match-for-a-pro/index.htm [hereinafter Legal 
DIY Websites]. 
 125. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the 
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 968 (2000) (describing legal services as credence 
goods).  
 126. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, Some Early Thoughts on Liability Standards for Online 
Providers of Legal Services, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 541, 544 (2015); Rhode & Ricca, supra note 
40, at 2592.  
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from faulty wills until the testator has died. Moreover, for an action to arise 
at that point would require that the beneficiaries who were harmed (1) 
realized the problem, (2) had standing to sue, and (3) were motivated to sue, 
perhaps after having to challenge or construe the will. Thus, these are likely 
not the best measure of success for these legal technologies.  
Instead, we need better assessments of how these technological 
interventions fare in practice, undertaken while testators are alive and able to 
describe their testamentary desires.127 Professional regulation affords 
consumer protection through quality control and the imposition of liability.128 
If technological interventions are not going to be subject to this form of 
control, then perhaps self-testing of the kind described might form part of the 
novel regulatory regimes offered by some scholars as an alternative to UPL 
restrictions.129 If made public, such accuracy rates could at least provide 
consumers with additional information on which to select among competing 
providers.  
However, these analyses—even if undertaken rigorously and 
objectively—must contend with a further empirical issue: defining the 
appropriate comparison. Critics of self-drafting will programs point out ways 
in which the work product of an estate-planning lawyer would be superior to 
that of a lay individual using legal technology.130 However, proponents argue 
that the appropriate comparison is not a will drafted by an estate-planning 
specialist, but one drafted by an individual without any assistance.131 A 
further possibility is to compare the result of a self-drafted will against the 
distribution mandated by the laws of intestacy; because these default rules 
come into play when an individual dies intestate and are designed to 
                                                                                                                 
 127. For an example of a preliminary study focused on statutory wills, see Beyer, supra 
note 92. For a discussion of how empirical evidence is necessary to resolve debates about 
estate-planning reforms, see Horton, Wills Law, supra note 71, at 1101 (discussing the 
“impasse” between formalists and reformers that arose in the absence of empirical evidence 
“about the law’s real-world impact”).  
 128. See Remus & Levy, supra note 15, at 545. The issue of liability for the actions of 
legal technology is another important consideration. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Path of 
Robotics Law, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 45, 52 (2015). 
 129. Susan Saab Fortney, Online Legal Documents and the Public Interest: Using a Public 
Access Approach to Balance Access to Justice and Public Protection, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 91 
(2019). 
 130. See sources cited supra note 22. 
 131. Legal DIY Websites, supra note 124 (reporting that specialists retained to review wills 
prepared using software found that while the wills prepared using the software were not as 
good as those that would be prepared by a specialist, they were better than those generated 
without any assistance).  
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implement the preferences of the average testator, it seems reasonable to 
expect legal technology to improve on this outcome.132 Yet, the identity of 
the appropriate control group remains unsettled, as is our understanding of 
the effectiveness of existing interventions. 
D. Validity and Enforceability 
An additional concern raised by technological interventions into estate 
planning is the legal validity and enforceability of the resulting instruments. 
To be valid, testators must execute estate-planning instruments in accordance 
with required formalities; for wills, this generally includes signing in the 
presence of two witnesses.133 Doctrinal reform in some states may offer relief 
for errors in execution,134 but execution remains so important—and 
potentially problematic—that lawyers who prepare documents should 
oversee their execution to ensure compliance with professional 
responsibilities.135 “[I]n some jurisdictions supervision of the execution of 
estate-planning documents constitutes the practice of law . . . .”136  
Wills and other estate-planning instruments are also invalid if the testator 
lacks the requisite capacity.137 Estate-planning lawyers have a responsibility 
not to draft instruments for individuals who lack capacity, and can also assist 
clients who do have capacity to protect against later challenges. In contrast, 
technological interventions that do not incorporate assessments of 
testamentary capacity may generate invalid instruments and offer no 
protection against later challenges.  
Finally, estate-planning instruments are unenforceable to the extent that 
their provisions violate public policy.138 For example, courts will not enforce 
conditions that restrict a transferee’s opportunities for marriage or encourage 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Put another way, this would require that the technology at least do no harm! 
 133. See infra Section II.A.  
 134. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010) (adopting the 
harmless error rule). 
 135. ACTEC COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES, supra note 121, at 15.  
 136. Id. at 16. 
 137. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (requiring that testators be of “sound mind”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2003) (describing the requirements of mental capacity to make a donative transfer).  
 138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.1 (AM. LAW INST. 
1983) (noting that donative transfers are conditioned with a restraint on personal conduct void 
if contrary to public policy or illegal).  
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divorce.139 Estate-planning attorneys should advise clients on these matters; 
existing technological interventions may not.  
It is true that these issues represent a challenge to any self-drafted will. If 
unassisted self-drafted wills are the appropriate comparison, technological 
interventions may not fare any worse. However, if the claim is that legal 
technology will disrupt this area of practice by substituting for the services 
of lawyers, then each of these issues represents a legitimate concern. 
E. Estate Administration 
Finally, it is important to note that wills are given effect only at death when 
presented to the probate court. Court appearances are one of the areas viewed 
as least susceptible to technological disruption.140 Thus, before we write off 
probate lawyers entirely, we might also consider their role in estate 
administration. Nonprobate transfers and informal estate administration have 
removed many cases from the probate court docket,141 decreasing this need. 
Yet, as a result, probate courts are increasingly devoted to contested 
matters,142 in which legal representation is likely even more important.143 If 
estate-planning instruments that testators self-draft with technological 
assistance are more likely to be contested or to require construction than other 
instruments, legal technology may have the unintended consequence of 
increasing legal needs in estate administration. Whether this is the case is an 
empirical question on which we lack systematic data.  
IV. Implications 
This Article has focused on will-preparation programs because they are 
frequently cited as an example of disruptive legal technology successfully 
increasing access to justice. However, the analysis suggests several themes 
that are relevant to predictions of the future of the legal profession and access 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Id. § 6.2 (providing that restriction on first marriage in a donative transfer is void if it 
“unreasonably limit[s] the transferee’s opportunity to marry”); id. § 7.1 (stating that donative 
transfers encouraging separation or divorce are invalid).  
 140. McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 5, at 3042 (“[B]ecause machines will not speak in 
court for the foreseeable future, oral advocates will continue to enjoy a lucrative niche . . . .”). 
 141. See, e.g., Horton, Wills Law, supra note 71, at 1121-23 (noting how informal probate 
practices reduced the probate court docket in Alameda County, California).  
 142. Horton, Partial Defense, supra note 60, at 611 (describing the prevalence of contested 
matters, “quasi-adversarial” matters, and creditors’ claims in a sample of probate estates).  
 143. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise: Understanding Relational 
and Substantive Expertise Through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 909, 924 (2015) 
(finding that lawyers’ ability to navigate complex procedures—as in litigation—does much to 
explain the association between legal representation and improved case outcomes).  
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to justice in the age of artificial intelligence more broadly. Together, these 
themes complicate many existing predictions, which largely “exist at the 
extremes.”144  
To develop predictions that are more realistic, scholars must account for 
the interplay between technology and structural social inequality. As Frank 
Pasquale writes, “Our legal system exacerbates inequality because of uneven 
access to resources for advocacy, not lack of automation.”145 While 
automation may have the potential to expand legal services to markets that 
are currently underserved,146 development of these technologies is driven by 
the market.147 To the extent that servicing consumer-law needs remains 
insufficiently profitable, technologies that might address these needs are 
unlikely to be generated. Even if they are, adoption represents a further 
challenge that must be overcome for legal technology to succeed.148  
This relates to a second theme, which is the tension between complete 
substitution and technological augmentation. As other scholars have pointed 
out, even document review—another area frequently hailed as perfect for 
automation—requires training and human intervention in close cases.149 Is 
substitutive technology truly likely to become more feasible, profitable, and 
better for clients than augmentative technology? What are the potential 
additional unintended effects of substitutive technology?150 Perhaps a more 
realistic prediction is the expanded use of non-lawyers interacting with legal 
technology to expand access to legal services. This would build upon the 
increasing recognition of the potential for non-lawyer providers to meet 
client needs151 and for technology to enhance human productivity.  
                                                                                                                 
 144. Remus & Levy, supra note 15, at 556.  
 145. Frank Pasquale, Automating the Professions: Utopian Pipe Dream or Dystopian 
Nightmare?, L.A. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 15, 2016), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/automa 
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 146. Yoon, supra note 15.  
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 148. Id. at 541 (noting that the pace of technological disruption depends on “advances in 
natural language processing while the pace of adoption would depend on client pressures”).  
 149. Id. at 517.  
 150. Balkin, supra note 128, at 57 (describing what he terms the “substitution effect”).  
 151. See, e.g., REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & THOMAS M. CLARKE, ROLES BEYOND LAWYERS: 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESEARCH REPORT 3 (2016), http://www. 
americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/new_york_city_court_navigators_report
_final_with_final_links_december_2016.pdf; Deborah Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services 
by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 214-15 (1990).  
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Finally, the case of consumer-focused technological interventions in estate 
planning highlights the significance of not only professional regulation but 
also doctrinal law for the future of legal technology. Professional regulation 
is recognized as a threat to the emergence of new technologies.152 However, 
these are not the only relevant gatekeeping provisions.153 Self-drafting will 
programs could never have taken hold without earlier doctrinal reforms, and 
their ongoing success is similarly dependent on the development of doctrinal 
law governing execution, construction, and administration of estate-planning 
instruments.  
Although these themes are drawn from the example of relatively low-tech 
self-drafting programs for wills, they are likely relevant for emerging 
technologies as well, although they manifest differently. For example, 
massive computing power and big data might facilitate personalized default 
rules for intestacy.154 Artificial intelligence would identify patterns of 
testamentary intentions and then generate individualized default rules that 
would be more likely to represent the testamentary desires of a given 
decedent. This could expand access to justice in the sense of improving 
outcomes for decedents who forego or are unable to undertake estate 
planning during life.  
However, even this technologically sophisticated approach is not free 
from the empirical complexities identified in this Article. First, the 
stubbornness of social inequality would likely be evident in ongoing patterns 
of intestacy (which decedents’ estates were subject to the personalized 
default rules) as well as the content of the individualized intestacy laws 
themselves. Probabilistic preferences would be developed from a corpus of 
data that is itself a function of existing social structures. Family structure, 
wealth, gender, race and ethnicity, education, and religion all likely 
contribute to testamentary preferences; it is unclear whether personalized 
defaults would accurately account for variation on these dimensions. 155  
                                                                                                                 
 152. See sources cited supra note 40.  
 153. Sheppard, supra note 22, at 1846.  
 154. Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure 
with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1419 (2014) (proposing personalized intestacy 
provisions).  
 155. Our current empirical understanding of variation in preferences across these 
dimensions is quite limited. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, TEACHER’S MANUAL: 
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 2-15 (10th ed. 2017) (“To our knowledge, there has never been 
a good study of the fit between intestacy rules and the family structures of varied racial and 
ethnic communities. This is a regrettable lacuna in the literature.”). The suggestion that only 
a “bit more research” is needed to understand the role of observable characteristics in 
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Second, issues surrounding substitution and the lingering role for humans 
also apply. First, it is not clear that the development of personalized defaults 
should proceed without human intervention. This is especially true given the 
evolution of social norms and testamentary preferences. If donative transfers 
comprise the data corpus, the predictive results would reflect the preferences 
of individuals currently making donative transfers, who are likely to be older. 
Individuals who died relatively young could thus be subject to defaults that 
reflect norms and preferences that are in the process of falling out of fashion. 
While the relative timing of social change and legal change is always a 
potential issue, the bottom-up approach of personalized defaults may 
exacerbate it. In addition, it is possible that the elegance of the technological 
intervention would give way to messy realities as humans attempted to 
administer estates with awkward divisions.156 Finally, adoption of these 
default rules would require massive doctrinal changes, even if they overcome 
challenges regarding UPL. Thus, even predictions for future legal 
technologies require empirical grounding.  
Conclusion 
Technological advances are modifying the practice of law and reshaping 
the boundaries between lawyers and clients. Some legal futurists foresee a 
bleak future for the legal profession, as the work of lawyers is increasingly 
automated. Others are more sanguine, emphasizing the potential for 
technology to enhance lawyers’ ability to serve clients. Across this spectrum, 
however, scholars espouse the potential of legal technology to increase 
access to justice, with DIY estate planning frequently offered as an 
illustration. Yet, there are several empirical realities that challenge this 
prediction. Human frailties hinder the willingness and ability of many 
individuals to engage successfully with new technologies, while market 
forces shape the design and availability of technology in ways that may not 
address the needs of all. These realities limit the potential for disruptive 
technology to diminish the legal profession while expanding access to justice 
and illustrates the need to ground our expectations for legal technology in 
empirical realities. The future for lawyers and access to justice in the age of 
artificial intelligence is bright complicated. 
 
                                                                                                                 
predicting testamentary preferences is quite optimistic. See Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 
154, at 1477.  
 156. That is, unless the personalized defaults are carried out via automated wire transfer 
and physical distribution by court-appointed robots. 
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